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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 2001 during the aftermath of the sudden collapse of Swissair, at the time
one of Europe’s most prestigious airlines, Oliver Hart noted that the company
could probably have been saved had there been coordinated action in the Swiss
ﬁnancial market among all lenders involved prior to the initiation of formal
bankruptcy proceedings (see Hart (2001)).
Drawing on private information collected from major German banks, this
paper analyzes a ﬁnancial institution, the bank pool (’Bankenpool’), which is
able to eliminate the risk of uncoordinated creditor action when corporate dis-
t r e s si si m m i n e n t . W eﬁnd bank pools to be a commonly used coordination
device within the German ﬁnancial system. Despitei t si m p o r t a n c ef o rﬁnancial
contracting and for the economics of relationship lending in distress, bank pools
have rarely been taken into account by outside observers and academics. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst analysis of the pool institution, and its
role in corporate distress.
Our data set comprises medium-sized, privately held non-ﬁnancial companies
in Germany, sampled from the credit ﬁles of the largest commercial banks. Most
companies in the sample (91 out of 95) have multiple bank relationships, with
am e d i a no f5, and a maximum of 17 banks. Multiple banking is common in
many countries around the world. For large public companies from 22 countries,
Ongena and Smith (2000) ﬁnd the average number of bank relationships to vary
from 2.9 in Norway to 15.2 in Italy. They attribute the cross-country diﬀerences
to the concentration of the banking system and to the strength of creditor rights.
Weaker concentration in the local banking market and stronger creditor rights
tend to go hand in hand with more bank relationships.
Rajan (1992) states multiple banking may well be beneﬁcial in normal times
because it eliminates the hold-up risk inherent in single-source bank ﬁnancing.
Multiple banking also protects the debtor against a sudden deterioration of
the liquidity position of the bank, as argued by Detragiache et al. (2000).
However, if the borrower himself is in distress, multiple banking is likely to be
a disadvantage. In such a situation coordination between creditors is required,
but may be diﬃcult to achieve. There is a large body of literature that focuses
on the diﬃculties experienced by multiple lenders attempting to coordinate
their actions. For example, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) analyze the free-
rider problem in corporate distress, and Morris and Shin (2004) emphasize the
associated welfare loss of a creditor run.
We ﬁnd no evidence of creditor runs before or during the distress episodes
experienced by the companies in our sample. Loan terminations typically oc-
cur after a prolonged distress episode only. However, we observe an extensive
involvement of banks in debt restructuring and workout activities. The involve-
ment in distress episodes covers, among other things, the allocation of fresh
money to the troubled borrower, the hiring of experts to provide management
consultancy and, in some cases, the pressing for management dismissal. The
active involvement of the banks is often, but not always, accompanied by ex-
plicit coordination among the lenders. In 46% of all cases in our sample, the
2group of bank lenders concludes a formal contractual agreement that eﬀectively
aligns investment incentives. This agreement is called a pool arrangement. The
pool is set up around the onset of a distress episode, and it will be disbanded
when the company has been successfully worked out, has been sold, or when it is
liquidated. The rules and regulations governing the life of the pool are a result
of private contracting. The pool institution, together with its internal decision
rules, is an arrangement that is strictly based on incentive compatibility and
reputation eﬀects.
Our paper thus analyzes how, in distress episodes, lender coordination is
achieved through private contracting. We also evaluate to what extent coordi-
nation facilitates workouts. Our major ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.
First, multiple lending is widespread among distressed medium-sized companies
in Germany. Second, and contrary to common belief among many observers1,
we ﬁnd that banks engage regularly and intensively in the workout of distressed
borrowers. This fact has escaped the notice of many political and academic
observers as well as government statisticians because private workout activi-
ties usually commence well before formal bankruptcy proceedings are initiated.
Third, at the onset of ﬁnancial distress for a borrower, explicit coordination
among its lenders is common, leading to the formation of bank pools. These
pools initially aim at the revitalization of the distressed company. Bank pools
with few members (small pools) signiﬁcantly shorten the length of the workout
period, and they increase the likelihood of a successful turnaround during a
reorganization process. In contrast, pools with many member banks experience
longer workout duration, and a smaller turnaround probability even by compar-
ison to distressed companies without a pool, which calls the ex post eﬃciency
of the pool into question. Fourth, the formation of the pool itself depends on
the severity of the workout task at hand. Thus, pools are more likely to emerge
when the ex-ante default probability is high, the number of bank relationships
is large, and when, among all bank lenders of a given borrower, the outstanding
debt does not diﬀer considerably.
The results reported in this paper suggest that even under a creditor-friendly
bankruptcy code, like the one in Germany, there need not be a bias towards liq-
uidation. For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to consider two major
characteristics of the German insolvency code2 that stand in contrast to the
rules of the US legislation (Chapter 11). First, debt seniority is respected by
the courts throughout the proceedings. This renders collateral rights and ad-
ditional, privately negotiated arrangements highly dependable and, thus, valu-
able3. Second, the old German code does not stipulate an automatic stay against
1See Drukarczyk (2002) for a summary of the discussions in Germany throughout the
eighties, eventually leading to the 1999 reform of the German insolvency code.
2Throughout the paper we focus on the German pre-1999 insolvency code, which existed
until January 1999. It is therefore relevant for the data used in this study. Court-supervised
proceedings could take one of two routes, compulsory liquidation (Konkursordnung), or settle-
ment (Vergleichsordnung), although the latter was only rarely chosen. In both cases, control
shifted from the owner-manager to a trustee empowered and supervised by the court.
3A recent study by Davydenko and Franks (2005) reports an average recovery rate of 67%,
3secured creditors, i.e. a period in which creditors are barred from liquidating
their secured claims and management has the freedom of action to reorganize
the company. Both aspects have profound implications for the relationship be-
tween borrowers and lenders. The strict validity of collateral rights creates a
motive for creditors to enter into a private contract that stipulates the pooling
of the non-collateralized parts of the claims, with no fear of unilateral creditor
action. Thus, it eﬀectively substitutes for an automatic stay. This feature of the
insolvency code oﬀers an explanation of why bank pools are able to reach sta-
ble arrangements among all members, despite the fact that some lenders have
less collateral than others and therefore stand to loose more if liquidation is
ineﬃciently postponed. Furthermore, the legal force of debt seniority rules in a
future court ruling explains why lenders are willing to invest fresh money for a
workout into an otherwise distressed company. Given the widespread existence
of pre-bankruptcy bank pool arrangements, workouts are so exhaustive that
bankruptcies almost always lead to piecemeal liquidations. The reason is that
serious workout attempts that receive support from the lenders are carried out
well before the initiation of formal bankruptcy proceedings. If this interpre-
tation is correct, a common criticism of the German Konkursordnung, namely
its poor workout performance, is in fact misplaced. A more reasonable view
emphasizes the strong pre-bankruptcy workout incentives embedded in the old
code. As suggested by our ﬁndings, the code supports timely lender coordina-
tion and pool formation activities that would probably not be supported in a
more debtor-friendly legal environment.
A cursory view to France and Italy conﬁrms the relevance of the bankruptcy
code for pool arrangements. Relying on interviews and the literature4,t h e r ei s
no pool-like arrangement in France with its debtor-oriented regime, following
the classiﬁcation by LaPorta et al. (1998). In contrast, there are informal pool-
like institutions in Italy, which is said to have a creditor-friendly bankruptcy
regime.
Our ﬁndings also have implications for theory. Most importantly, the forma-
tion of pools in a multi-banking environment questions the existence of a simple
tradeoﬀ between the number of banks and the ability of lenders to enter into
debt renegotiation with their borrower. Our ﬁndings underline the relevance of
the bankruptcy code’s de lege ferenda, i.e. its legal practice. Above all, this
latter characteristic refers to the extent to which collateral rights are eﬀectively
recognized throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. The strong legal position of
creditor rights in countries like Germany, therefore, may well help to overcome
the free-rider problem inherent in multiple banking. As will be shown later, the
pooling refers to the non-collateralized portion of outstanding debt, which is
most exposed to ineﬃcient liquidation decisions by other banks. A second im-
plication for ﬁnancial theory concerns the modeling of a bankruptcy code. Our
ﬁndings suggest that it is important to consider the ex-ante eﬀects of a code,
while Grunert and Weber (2005) ﬁnd 72%.
4For France, see Bloch et al. (1995) and Pochet (2002) as well as Proust and Cadillat
(1996). For Italy, see Brogi and Santella (2004).
4rather than modeling its de lege lata, i.e. its formal rules. As we demonstrate in
this paper with respect to the workout behavior of banks, these ex-ante eﬀects
can be very diﬀerent from the explicit rules laid down in the code itself. For
example, while the German bankruptcy code is clearly liquidation-oriented ex-
post, we nevertheless ﬁnd clear evidence of ex-ante lender coordination. There-
fore, a bias toward liquidation is not a necessary implication of strong creditor
rights because cooperative private contracting arrangements arise to supplement
bankruptcy law.
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 gives a brief account of the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature and states our major hypotheses. Section 3
lays out the institutional details of the bank pool and describes the data set in
some detail, including the clients’ debt structure, the workout proceedings, and
the occurrence and the structure of bank pools. Section 4 presents the testing
methodology and discusses the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review and derivation of main hy-
potheses
Much of the recent literature on the pricing of debt, on the design of debt con-
tracts and, more broadly, on the properties of the banking system focuses on
the borrower-lender bargaining process when there are several lenders. The case
of multiple lending is interesting from a modeling perspective, and it is relevant
from an empirical perspective. In the models of Bergman and Callen (1991),
Rajan (1992), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Berglof et al. (2000), multiple
lending solves the moral hazard problem underlying the basic borrower-lender
relationship. The incentive for the borrower to default strategically can be over-
come by establishing several lending relationships since multiple debt is harder
to renegotiate, or is even non-renegotiable. In Rajan’s model, multiple banking
achieves the ﬁrst best if (and only if) all banks are equally close monitors.
All the papers enumerated so far recognize that the beneﬁts of multiple lend-
i n gh a v et ob et r a d e do ﬀ against the costs. The common source of the costs
in all models is a state of low return realization in which the company is not
able to meet its contractual repayment obligations. In this state, ineﬃciencies
arise from the inability to renegotiate multiple debt, from the higher cost of
renegotiation, or from reduced expected liquidation values. Rajan (1992) and
Bergman and Callen (1991) argue that ineﬃciencies in liquidity default stem
from free-rider problems. An increase in the number of lenders lowers the prob-
ability that a single lender is pivotal in renegotiation. Hence, small lenders in
particular have an incentive to free ride.
In a second group of papers, it is argued that the major problem associated
with multiple lending arises from bargaining among lenders rather than between
lenders and a common borrower. The common pool or collective action problem
addresses the risk of coordination failure. Although renegotiation is in the
collective interest of all creditors, individually they may ﬁnd pre-emptive debt
5collection favorable. They will tend to foreclose on their loans in fear of similar
actions by other lenders, although the company’s prospects may in fact be sound.
Underinvestment will be the consequence. Multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria arise,
which resemble a bank run as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The
idea of coordination risk is applied to the pricing of corporate debt by Morris
and Shin (2004). In our study we ﬁnd, nevertheless, that lenders coordinate
among themselves quite often. We observe pool arrangements in almost half of
all cases.
The available empirical literature on workout processes and results is based
almost exclusively on data from large US companies, whereby formal proce-
dures under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Reform Act are compared with
informal, private reorganizations of distressed companies. Gilson et al. (1990),
for example, study the characteristics of 169 ﬁnancially distressed US compa-
nies. About half of these companies have restructured their outstanding debt
privately, while the other half sought protection under Chapter 11. Their ﬁnd-
ings suggest that companies are more likely to be successfully restructured when
the number of lenders is small and the share of bank debt is high. Franks and
Torous (1994) compare private restructuring, organized as an exchange oﬀer,
with Chapter 11 reorganizations. Their analysis shows that in private restruc-
turing recovery rates are on average higher and deviation from absolute priority
is more likely. James (1996) adds to this by showing that exchange oﬀers are
more likely when the debt structure of the distressed companies involves bank
loans. There are only few papers dealing with non-US data of which we are
aware. Franks and Sussman (2005), who investigate a sample of non-ﬁnancial
SMEs in the UK, report a predominance of single bank relationships. There is
no indication of either debt forgiveness or creditor runs, which the authors relate
to the speciﬁcity of the British insolvency code. Davydenko and Franks (2005)
study recovery rates within the UK, France, and Germany. They ﬁnd that na-
tional bankruptcy codes aﬀect recovery rates substantially although diﬀerences
across the three countries are not fully reﬂected in pricing.
2.1 Determinants of pool formation
As an initial test we will try to identify the determinants of the formation
of pools. We start with the assumption that in distress there are monitoring
costs for each bank, yielding economies of pool formation that are positively
related to the number of banks included in the pool. These monitoring costs
refer to both, monitoring of the borrower and monitoring of other lenders, in
fear of their preemptive actions. The formation of a bank pool allows to avoid
duplicated monitoring of the borrower and to delegate it to the pool leader.
The pool leader is compensated for his tasks with a ﬁxed annual fee speciﬁed
in the pool contract. The fee varies with total exposure, but is not directly
related to the number of pool banks.5 The cost of monitoring other lenders can
5The ﬁxed annual fee varies roughly between 50,000 € for large exposures and 10,000 €
for smaller ones as corroborated by interview evidence. See Section 3.1 for further details on
6be diminished as well since pool formation commits pool banks to coordinated
behavior. Due to the fact that coordination risk can only be eliminated when all
banks participate in the pool, the formation of the pool is an "all-or-nothing"
decision, i.e. either all banks join or there will be no pool. Credibility ensues
from the repeated interaction of a limited group of banks in distress situations of
their clients which makes the pool attractive even for well collateralized banks.
Recapitulating we argue, since pool formation allows monitoring to be delegated
or makes it redundant, it leads under the assumption of Coasian contracting
to a decrease of aggregate monitoring costs. Clearly, the economies of pool
f o r m a t i o nh a v et ob et r a d e do ﬀ against the bargaining costs within the pool
that presumably also rise with pool size. With prior evidence on the relative
magnitudes of these eﬀects we suggest
Hypothesis 1: The formation of pools becomes more likely when the number
o fb a n kr e l a t i o n s h i p si si n c r e a s i n g .
The second hypothesis relates to the size distribution of oustanding loan
amounts across lenders. We postulate that free-riding incentives are small when
lending shares are equal among all lenders, and they rise when shares become
uneven.
Hypothesis 2: The more heterogeneous the distribution of lending shares,
the lower is the probability of pool formation.
The third hypothesis refers to the severity of the distress event. Not all dis-
tress shocks require workout action. If shocks to a borrower’s credit quality are
transitional, perhaps caused by a temporary downturn of the market, company-
speciﬁc workout activity by the lenders is not warranted. Instead, lenders will
wait for the upturn, which is likely to allow the recovery of the company’s credit
quality. These instances may be labeled ambulant, or out-patient cases, and we
compare them to the more severe, company-speciﬁc distress shocks requiring
lender action. The latter can be labeled in-patient cases, again alluding to the
hospital analogue. As a consequence, there are at least two reasons for not
forming a pool in distress, i.e. the inability to reach coordination among all
lenders and the non-necessity to coordinate workout eﬀorts among lenders.
Hypothesis 3: The probability of pool formation is positively related to the
severity of the distress shock.
Note that in order to form a pool, eventually all the banks will have to agree
that the prospects of the borrower are such that uniﬁed action is warranted.
Therefore, substantial shocks to credit quality are more likely to be interpreted
unambiguously as signals of distress by all lenders.
Additionally, the decision to form a pool may be aﬀected by the size of the
company, the quality of the bank relationship, the individual strategies of the
banks involved, the general economic conditions prevailing at the time of the
distress event, and the industry to which the distressed company belongs.
the pool contract.
7Borrower size. Given that a bank pool involves coordination costs, the
banks’ decision on pool formation also depends on the size of the borrower.
We measure size by the company’s total assets. Size should have an impact on
expected future revenues out of which banks’ costs will have to be covered. We
therefore hypothesize that company size is positively related to the probability
of pool formation.
Housebank and collateralization. The housebank typically has superior in-
formation and a senior position in terms of collateral, as was shown by Elsas
and Krahnen (1999). It may thus take a leading role in the formation of a
bank pool. Higher collateralization itself yields higher expected recovery and
therefore lowers the incentive to participate in workouts and bank pools.
Bank identity. There may well be systematic diﬀerences between banks
with respect to their willingness to engage in a bank pool. Recall that the
banks in our sample comprise the biggest banks from all three German banking
sectors, namely private banks, savings banks (mostly owned by communities),
and cooperative banks.
Economic conditions and industry. The willingness to engage in pool oper-
ations may also be inﬂuenced by the general economic conditions prevailing at
the onset of distress, and the company’s business focus.
2.2 Determinants of workout success
We consider the eﬀect of pool formation on the workout success of a distressed
borrower ﬁrst. Pool formation helps to avoid the costs resulting from ineﬃcient
liquidations and prolonged workouts. Hypothesis 4 therefore relates to the eco-
nomic costs of free-riding that is caused by multiple banking, and that is central
to the models of Rajan (1992) and Bergman and Callen (1991).
Hypothesis 4: The presence of a pool arrangement increases the probability
of workout success, and reduces the length of time needed to conclude a workout
process.
A second explanatory variable that is expected to inﬂuence the probability
of workout success is the number of bank relationships. It refers to the marginal
eﬀect of coordination. If the number of lenders is large, lenders are more likely
to see themselves as non-pivotal for the ultimate survival of the company, and
are therefore more inclined to walk away without contributing to a workout
ﬁnancing, or without coordinating with other lenders of a distressed borrower.
The deﬁnition of ’large’ with respect to the number of lenders is, of course, an
empirical question.
Hypothesis 5: The probability of recovery from a distress situation is neg-
atively related to the number of lenders.
Third, given that a bank pool has been formed, we expect bargaining costs
to be directly proportional to the number of banks in a pool. The main reason
for this hypothesis rests on the incentive of small creditors in large pools to
deny concessions, or in general to be less actively involved in a restructuring
8process and, therefore, to be less committed to timely action. In contrast, ’large’
pools are expected to need more time for decision-making, thereby stretching
a workout over time. This may be costly in terms of opportunity costs as
well as in terms of options foregone. Furthermore, since ’large’ pools are less
prepared to act ﬂexibly, they are likely to liquidate distressed companies more
frequently than ’small’ pools. Taken together, we expect debtors with small
pools to recover faster from distress, and therefore to have a shorter duration
in the distress mode.
Hypothesis 6: Small pools are more likely to be associated with successful
reorganizations than large pools.
Finally, the probability of recovery is conditional on the severity of the dis-
tress shock. The distinction between ambulant and in-patient cases is expected
to aﬀect recovery probability. Thus, ambulant cases will have experienced a
rather light and temporary distress shock, which renders recovery likely even if
there is no workout activity from the banks. In contrast, in-patient cases are
characterized by a rather severe and more permanent distress shock, and recov-
ery typically depends upon active workout involvement by the banks concerned.
Hypothesis 7: The probability of workout success is negatively related to
the severity of the distress shock.
In addition, the economic condition prevailing at the onset of distress may
well have an impact on the probability of workout success.
3 Distressed loans and bank pools: Descriptive
statistics and institutional design
Almost half of the distressed companies analyzed in this paper involve so-called
bank pools as part of the restructuring. These pools have a sophisticated in-
stitutional structure, with potentially important implications for the behavior
of banks when their corporate client is in trouble. The contractual features of
bank pools are outlined in the next subsection, followed by detailed description
of the data set and some descriptive statistics.
3.1 Bank pools: Contract features
The institution of a ’bank pool’ is a formal contractual arrangement in which
lenders pool their individual claims vis-à-vis a particular borrower in distress
in order to coordinate their decision-making. Typically, when a company with
multiple bank relationships becomes distressed, its banks summon a so-called
’bank meeting’. This meeting serves the purpose of discussing how to deal with
the company currently in distress, and deciding in particular whether or not a
formal pool among the banks should be set up. In case this latter decision is
aﬃrmative, the contract is concluded without delay.
9The standard pool contract has been used throughout the last thirty years.
Its special format is adapted to the needs of distress situations. An abbreviated
English version of the standard pool contract is in the appendix (see also Scholz
and Lwowski (1994) and Hellner and Steuer (2001) for a complete German text).
Core elements of the standard pool contract are as follows:
• a list of contracting parties and outstanding loans;
• a description of pool leader responsibilities, including the administration
of collateral;
• an agreement about the joint and mutual settlement of credit account
balances between participating banks;
• an agreement about the distribution of revenues from liquidation, sale, or
ongoing client business;
• a sharing rule concerning the costs of running the pool;
• a sharing arrangement concerning relevant default information, and
• an agreement about the duration of the contract, and exit rules.
From interviews we know that typically a bank pool comprises all active bank
lenders. The contract speciﬁes in particular how proceeds from outstanding
loans, as well as costs related to the workout, are to be shared among pool
members. Failure to reach a consensus on these issues usually prevents the
establishment of the pool. The existence of a pool arrangement is revealed to
the participating institutions, and to the distressed company. The latter also
co-signs the pool contract as he will be charged the pool leader’s costs of running
the pool. In liquidation, these costs are guaranteed by all pool members. Pool
costs are an annual fee, which is agreed on in the pool arrangement dependent
on exposure size. This claim is senior to all other claims held by the creditor
pool.
Third parties are not necessarily informed about the establishment of a pool,
if the company’s distress hasn’t been disclosed yet. In our ﬁeld interviews, this
disclosure policy was justiﬁed as follows. If the distress is public information,
the existence of a pool is a positive signal that lenders are willing to engage in a
workout. However, if the distress is not publicly known, the establishment of a
pool is a negative signal, indicating a distress situation. The liquidity situation
of a troubled company will be adversely aﬀected by that signal.
When does a pool start, and when does it end? The initiation of a pool
is subject to a group decision involving all designated pool members. This
decision process may require some time. For this reason, the actual date of the
establishment of the pool will, in most cases, not coincide exactly with the date
of the distress event, i.e. the date of the loan downgrading to highly speculative
or even default grade. Rather, pool formation occurs in the vast majority of
cases shortly before, at, or shortly after the distress event. The duration of
10the pool arrangement is unlimited, a priori. Once established, it will last until
the reorganization is completed, i.e. until the company is able to attract new
lenders, or else until it is liquidated. In either case, the pool contract is phased
out rather than formally dissolved.
From ﬁeld interviews, supported by our data, we know that only non-
collateralized junior loans are pooled. (Partially) collateralized creditors’ par-
ticipation in the pool corresponds to the non-collateralized portion of their
debt. Thus, junior lenders, or more precisely, lenders in proportion to their
non-collateralized debt will raise the fresh money needed for the workout in
accordance with pre-speciﬁed pool quotas. This scenario has been observed
throughout the decades since bank pools were ﬁrst established. It is important
to mention that this scenario does not in any way imply that senior banks,
notably highly collateralized housebanks, are left out of pool negotiations alto-
gether. The reason is that even housebanks typically have part of their loans
unsecured. Furthermore, banks have an informal standstill agreement regard-
ing the collateralized (non-pooled portion) of their debt, which, although not
contractually binding, is apparently suﬃcient to prevent pre-emptive action by
these parties. Once a pool exists, attempts are made to collateralize the hitherto
non-collateralized junior pool loans, i.e. to obtain additional collateral from the
borrower. This explains the existence of pool collateral, which refers to collat-
eral obtained after the pool was established. This must not be confused with
individual (’inherited’) collateral agreements already in existence before pool
formation occurs. Of course, collateralized banks are not willing to share their
inherited collateral assets with other banks. Thus, workout investments are
subordinate to this collateralized portion of debt and leave seniority unaﬀected.
The pool contract establishes a binding commitment for every bank to co-
ordinate its client-related actions with all other pool banks. Most importantly,
each bank commits itself to keeping her credit line open. This is believed to be
in the interests of every pool member, since it reduces uncertainty and stabi-
lizes the liquidity position of the company. Thus, the seizure of collateral or any
forced repayment is ruled out, unless the pool members decide unanimously to
the contrary. In general, revenues from the client’s ongoing business, or from
the realization of collateral are shared among pool banks in proportion to their
relevant credit balances. If banks learn individually about circumstances that
would endanger the repayment of debt, the information has to be shared among
all pool banks and, therefore, the otherwise rigid rule of bank secrecy is relaxed.
If a pool bank breaches the contract, e.g. by unilaterally reducing her credit
line, it becomes liable vis-à-vis the remaining pool banks to restore the agreed
pool quotas.
A priori, there is no reason why trade creditors should not join the pool.
Trade credit insurers are typically asked to join the pool, as they are repre-
senting the interest of their clients. In the present study, however, we have no
information about whether or not trade credit insurers were part of the pool.
Our empirical analysis, therefore, does not explicitly address the role of trade
credit in the restructuring process.
113.2 The data set and descriptive statistics
3.2.1 Sampling
The study relies on the CFS Loan Data Set, collected under the Center for Fi-
nancial Studies’ ﬁeld research project on Credit Management (see Elsas et al.
(1998) for further details). The data underlying our analysis include distressed
corporate debtors of six major German banks; four of them are private listed
companies, one is a public sector institution, and one is a cooperative bank.
The unit of observation is a particular borrowing company or, more speciﬁcally,
a particular bank-borrower relationship, using all the information regarding the
borrowing company contained in the credit ﬁles6 of a bank. The data set con-
tains in particular
• general characteristics of the company (e.g. legal form, industry);
• the company’s balance sheet data;
• an assessment of borrower risk, according to the bank’s internal risk rating;
• a complete account of the bank’s outstanding loans vis-à-vis the particular
borrower, taken from its loan book; this includes information on loan
terms, e.g. volume, maturity, collateral, spread;
• general information concerning other bank relationships of the company,
including the existence of a bank pool;
• measures taken by the bank in order to reorganize or liquidate the com-
pany, or its assets.
This information was collected directly from the banks’ credit ﬁles. Ob-
servations range from 1991 to 1999. The sample was drawn randomly from a
population of all those corporate customers who fulﬁlled the following set of
conditions at least once during 1992-1997.7
• First, companies had to be medium-sized, i.e. with an annual turnover
between €25 − 250m. Owing to the absence of surveillance by rating
agencies and the lack of rigorous disclosure requirements, we expected
this company size segment to be subject to a signiﬁcant degree of asym-
metric information between lenders and borrowers, thus constituting a
prime population for the analysis of issues related to relationship lending,
loan contract design, and renegotiation.
6The complete electronic and hardcopy documentation of the bank’s relationship with the
borrowing company.
7Random sampling was ensured in the following manner. The participating banks each
compiled electronically a list of account numbers of all clients who met the selection criteria
l i s t e db e l o w .B a s e do nt h e s e( a n o n y m i z e d )l i s t s ,w et h e nd r e war a n d o ms a m p l ef o re a c hb a n k
without bank intervention.
12• Second, to ensure a minimum level of information with regard to the
client’s total bank debt and the number of bank relationships, a minimum
total loan size of about €1.5m( D M3m) was imposed. All loans surpassing
this level are subject to the regulatory notiﬁcation requirement of Article
14 of the KWG (German Banking Act), and have to be communicated to
the federal banking supervisory agency BAFin (formerly BAKred). Thus,
mid-sized ﬁrms that had exclusively small loans would be excluded from
our sample.
• Third, clients with registered oﬃces in the former GDR (East Germany)
were excluded.
• Fourth, to generate a sample of distressed borrowers, companies had to
exhibit a poor internal rating at least once within the 1992-1997 period.
Ap o o rr a t i n gi sd e ﬁned as a rating of 5 or 6 on a standardized rating
scale applied to all banks in the sample ranging from 1 (highest grade) to
6 (lowest grade).
The resulting sample included 124 borrowers and a total number of 597 year-
end observations8. The incidence that a company entered distress in the last
period of our observation window occurred for 23 companies. We dropped these
observations since, for these companies, we have no information about distress
behavior or reorganisation outcome. For an additional 6 companies the relevant
balance sheet and loan information to be included in the regression analysis
were missing. We therefore eliminated these 6 cases too, which left us with a
sample of 95 companies and a total of 480 year-end observations.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the number of cases per bank, ranging from 8 to
22.A m o n g t h e 95 companies in the sample there are 44 credit relationships
involving pool arrangements as part of the workout process.
{insert Table 1 here}
As mentioned above, the onset of distress is documented by a downgrad-
ing of the client’s bank-internal rating to category 5 or 6 between 1992 and
1997, during which time the so-called distress event occurred. The frequency
distribution of distress events throughout the years of the observation window
is shown in Panel B of Table 1. The number of distress events occurring in 1997
is considerably smaller than in previous years due to the fact that at least one
year after the distress event needs to be observed.
Grouped according to industry sectors, Panel C of Table 1 shows that the
majority of companies come from the manufacturing (23) and machinery (25)
sectors. The third largest sector is trade, including both retail and wholesale,
with a total of 12 companies. Other sectors are far less frequently observed in
this sample.
8When there was more than one observation per year we only considered the last observa-
tion. However, we cumulated the information on distress measures taken by the bank over all
observations in the respective year.
133.2.2 Internal ratings and distress event
Internal ratings provided by bank lenders are a crucial characteristic of our data
set as the above description of the sampling procedure demonstrated. The rating
reﬂects the expected default probability of the company, as seen by the bank,
before collateralization is taken into account. We have no evidence of external
ratings, i.e. agency ratings, for any of the companies in our sample which is
reasonable given the fact that we are dealing with medium-sized companies.
The rating information has been collected on every borrower and for each
observation recorded in the ﬁles. Each bank in the sample uses its own rating
system in order to assess the probability of default by its borrowers. Ratings
are reviewed at regular intervals, typically every second year for high-rated
companies and at least once a year for companies of medium and low quality.
Commonly, low-quality companies are rated even more frequently, especially if
information touching upon the company’s creditworthiness is revealed.
The standard methodology of the rating process relies on a scoring system
with up to ﬁve diﬀerent main criteria, including quantitative and qualitative
information about company performance and prospects, and a linear weighting
system with both ﬁxed and varying weighting factors depending on the bank in
question (see Brunner et al. (2000) for details). We treat ratings as unbiased and
eﬃcient estimates of expected default probabilities, as judged by the individual
bank. As long as internal ratings remain the private information of the bank, i.e.
as long as rating information is not communicated to either the management of
the rated company, or to some supervisory body, there is no inherent incentive
for the bank to systematically misrepresent the information available. Internal
ratings are thus expected to be informationally eﬃcient (see Krahnen and Weber
(2001)).
The ratings of six diﬀerent banks based on diﬀerent rating scales have been
standardized in a transformed rating scale with six rating categories, in which
grades 5 and 6 describe borrowers that are distressed or even have defaulted
on their obligations. The standardization process is based on the banks’ rating
manuals that instruct credit oﬃcers about how to assign a company to a certain
rating category. Using these manuals, each category of a bank-individual rating
system was assigned to one of the six new categories of the standardized system
documented in Table 2. Table 2 also relates the bank-individual rating categories
as well as the standardized version to the rating scales of Moody’s and S&P
based on bank-internal translation rules.
{insert Table 2 here}
A distress event is thus deﬁned as the point in time when, for the ﬁrst time in
our observation window, a bank assigns its borrower a distress rating notch, i.e.
5 or, more severely, 6. We interpret the distress event as the onset of ﬁnancial
distress, which may or may not coincide with the date of default according to
the Basle II deﬁnition. In our sample, we ﬁnd 79 downgradings to rating 5
and 16 downgradings to rating 6 with the pool subsample comprising a higher
fraction of more severe downgradings (see Panel B of Table 1).
143.2.3 Company size and debt structure
One of the major sample selection criteria refers to company size, proxied by
annual turnover, representing medium-sized companies. Annual turnover had
to be larger than €25m and smaller than €250m . I nt h es a m p l eo f95 dis-
tressed companies, the average annual turnover is €61.6m. Companies with
pool arrangements are signiﬁcantly larger than those without pool both in terms
of mean (€76.6mv s .€48.7m )a n dm e d i a n( €62.1mv s .€35.6m) as shown in
Panel A of Table 3.
{insert Table 3 here}
In this size class, German companies typically do not issue public debt in-
struments. With regard to the companies’ debt structure, the average debt-to-
assets ratio is 70.1%. Bank loans constitute the main component of a company’s
debt with 74.3% alongside other forms of debt, e.g. trade credit and pension
liabilities. The fraction of bank debt in a company’s total debt is considerably
l a r g e ri nt h ed i s t r e s s e ds a m p l et h a ni nacomparable representative sample of
medium-sized German companies. For the latter, Elsas and Krahnen (1998)
found an average bank-debt to total-debt ratio of about 50%.
3.2.4 Relationship characteristics: Banks, loans and collateral
At the onset of distress, the number of bank relationships of the companies
in our sample averages 5.7, with median 5, ranging from single banking to as
many as 17 bank relationships. These values are close to the numbers for a
representative sample of German companies in the same size class, as reported
by Elsas et al. (1998). However, companies with pool arrangements tend to
have one more bank relationship on average than companies without pools; the
medians of the two subsamples diﬀer by 2 with weak signiﬁcance. The frequency
distributions of the number of banks for the pool subsample vs. the non-pool
subsample is presented in Figure 1.
{insert Figure 1 here}
In addition, we analyzed whether larger borrowers tend to have more bank
relationships and/or higher amounts of debt outstanding per bank. The bivari-
ate correlation analysis in Panel B of Table 3 suggests that for both subsamples,
the number of banks is only weakly increasing in company size, if at all, where
size is measured by both annual turnover or total assets. However, the average
debt per bank increases signiﬁcantly with company size, although only weakly
in the non-pool subsample. In other words, within our sample, banking rela-
tionships of larger companies are characterized by higher exposures per bank,
and not necessarily by a larger number of banks.
The average duration of bank relationships by the time of the distress event
is over 18 years with almost no diﬀerence between the pool and non-pool sub-
sample shown in Table 4. The sample exhibits an average overall credit line of
15€8.0m, about 79% of which is utilized at the onset of distress. The average frac-
tion of short-term loans in the total credit line is 42.6%, with short-term loans
possessing a lower average utilization rate of 63.3% and an average spread of
3.8%. All itemized relationship characteristics of pool and non-pool companies
do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
{insert Table 4 here}
If collateral rights are part of the lending agreement, we expect to see an
eﬀect on the expected recovery rate, on lender decision-making, and in particular
on the willingness to engage in pool formation. In our sample, the average share
of collateralized loans in total loan volume at the time of the distress event
amounts to 45.2% e x h i b i t e di nT a b l e5 ,w h i c hi so n et h i r dh i g h e rt h a ni na
representative sample9. Note that the pool and the non-pool subsample diﬀer
only slightly. A fraction of 14.7% of all bank-client relationships in the sample
is not collateralized at all, with 11.4% in the pool subsample and 17.6% for the
remaining non-pool companies as shown in Table 5.
{insert Table 5 here}
With respect to the type of collateral items involved, real estate is found to
be the major component of the total collateral value with an average of 53.7%
followed by stock, plant and machinery comprising a further 14.8% (see Table
5). Again, diﬀerences between the two subsamples are quite minor.
3.2.5 Workout
The onset of ﬁnancial distress, as measured by the initial distress rating, is
accompanied by an adjustment in bank behavior vis-à-vis the company. The
impact of bank activities on the borrower’s ﬁnancing constraint will take one of
two directions:
• Loosening the borrower’s ﬁnancial constraints by postponing due repay-
ments and interest payments, or even providing additional funds (fresh
money) to help the company overcome a liquidity shortage.
• Tightening the borrower’s ﬁnancial constraints by reducing credit lines,
terminating individual loans or requiring additional collateral in order to
discipline the company’s management.
However, loosening and tightening are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
The bank may, for example, provide fresh money whilst at the same time re-
quiring additional collateral. Additionally, the bank reacts to declining borrower
quality in ways not directly related to the size and structure of loan agreements,
for instance by increasing its monitoring. The term ’workout’ is commonly used
9In 1996, the average collateralization of loans in a representative sample of 98 medium-
sized companies was 31.5%. See Elsas and Krahnen (1999) for further details.
16to describe a bank’s eﬀorts to continue the lending relationship with a distressed
borrower. For some of the banks in our sample, the distress event corresponds
to the moment when competence for the respective client is transferred from the
local credit manager to a workout group on a senior level with speciﬁce x p e r t i s e
regarding reorganization as well as liquidation (not all banks had such workout
groups at the time of data collection, however).
At the onset of distress (t =0 ) , one third of all companies in the sample
face a credit line reduction, on average by 5.7% of their pre-distress total credit
line (see Table 4, column (viii), and Panel A of Table 6). After one year of
distress (t =1 ) , 20% of companies face another reduction (including second-
time reductions). Repayments are postponed for 8.4% of all companies at the
distress event, and for 10.5% one year later; numbers are considerably higher
for the pool subsample and lower for the non-pool subsample.
{insert Table 6 here}
Bank workout policy also involves consultancy services. Typically the dis-
tressed borrower is persuaded to hire an outside consultant to enhance manage-
ment capabilities, and also to improve the bank’s monitoring ability. According
to Panel A of Table 6, consultancy services were observed in 20 out of 95 cases,
two thirds of which belong to the pool subsample.
Bank loss provisions are observed in 21.1% of all cases at the distress onset
(Table 6, Panel A). This number increases to 29.5% one year later. Provisioning
is more often observed in pool cases than in non-pool cases.
Panel B of Table 6 describes the workout outcome at the end of our obser-
vation window. Almost half of all cases, 49.5%, are still in distress by the time
our window closes; rating improvements to rating notch 4 or better are recorded
for one third of all cases. A ﬁnal rating of 4 accounted for the majority of the
31 rating improvements (24) whereas the rating migrated to rating notch 3 only
four times and to rating notch 2 thrice. In 3.2% of all cases, banks were able to
close their books by rebanking their client, i.e. transferring the client to other
banks as part of a going-concern company sale. Formal bankruptcy occurred in
11 cases, and banks conducted an informal winding-up in 3 cases. In comparison
to pool cases, non-pool cases are more likely to emerge from distress (39.2% vs.
25.0%) by either a turnaround, i.e. a rating upgrade, or by rebanking.
The discrepancies between pool and non-pool subsample with respect to
workout measures and workout outcome can be related to the distinction be-
tween out-patient and in-patient cases introduced earlier suggesting that the
non-pool subsample comprises relatively more ambulant cases.
4 Estimation methodology and results
This section starts with an outline of the steps taken to test hypotheses 1 to 7.
The ﬁrst subsection deals with pool formation, while the second addresses pool
performance and workout success. All speciﬁcations use cross-sectional data and
17rely on the sample of 95 companies described above. We estimate the probability
of pool formation as a standard probit. Then we estimate how pool formation
aﬀects the probability of workout success. Since both, the probability of pool
formation and the probability of workout success may be related to the same
variables, the possibility of an endogeneity problem is apparent in this context.10
We will thus also run a model where the pool variable is instrumented. The
workout is deﬁned to be successful if a client company’s rating emerges from
the distress rating categories or when the company is successfully rebanked. In
addition, we use the length of the distress episode as an alternative measure of
workout success using a duration model. Essentially, this is an extension to the
probit analysis by a time dimension. It allows a prediction about the average
length of a workout for a distressed company with given characteristics.
4.1 Determinants of pool formation
The ﬁrst regression analysis will help us to understand the determinants of pool
formation. We relate the incidence of pool formation to the company’s banking
characteristics in order to test the hypotheses discussed in Section 2. In brief,
we hypothesized that the probability of pool formation is positively related to
the number of bank relationships, negatively related to the heterogeneity of
banks’ lending shares, and positively related to the severity of distress shock
experienced by the borrower. Companies with single bank relationships are
included in the regression, since there is a positive probability of observing
pools comprising the single bank as well as one, or several, non-bank creditors.
The independent variables, observed at the distress event, comprise the log
of the number of bank relationships (#banks), the absolute diﬀerence between
the bank’s actual share in total bank lending and a hypothetical uniform share
(skewness), and a dummy reﬂecting the poorest credit quality (rating6).
While there is no direct evidence on the diﬀerence between ambulant and in-
patient cases, we interpret rating6 to be an approximation of in-patient rather
than ambulant cases11.B a n k i d e n t i t y ( B1,B2,...,B6) serves as the constant
term of the regression. Taking (i) as the base case of the regression in Table 7,
speciﬁcations (ii)-(iv) address robustness by including diﬀerent control variables:
the business condition (ifo index), the housebank status12 (hb), the fraction of
10According to the literature on treatment eﬀects (see Heckman (1990, 1997) and Angrist
and Imbens (1991)), the average treatment eﬀe c to nt h et r e a t e di sm e a s u r e db yt h ee x t e n t
to which companies gain from pool formation in terms of workout success. An endogeneity
problem emerges if the decision to form a bank pool is related to the idiosyncratic component
of the workout success probability.
11The pooling of ambulant and in-patient cases in one data set creates an inference problem.
For ambulant cases, the simple passage of time alone may generate a rating recovery, not
requiring the formation of bank pools. On the other hand, for in-patient cases, the success
probability is expected to rise when a pool is established. An initial distress rating of 6 is our
best proxy for an in-patient company in need of serious restructuring. However, distressed
companies with initial distress rating of 5 are not necessarily ambulant.
12It describes whether or not the observed bank is the housebank. It should be kept in
18exposure that is collateralized (collateral), the size of the company using the
balance sheet total assets (assets), industry classiﬁcations (machin, manuf),
and the length of time between the distress event and the end of our observation
window (time2end). Equation (1) summarizes the set of explanatory factors
with respect to the probability of pool formation.
pool = f
µ
#banks,skewness,rating6,b1...6,ifo,
assets,hb,collateral,industry,time2end
¶
(1)
We ﬁnd pool formation to depend positively on (the log of) the number
of bank relationships13,t h u ss u p p o r t i n gH y p o t h e s i s1 . T h ec o e ﬃcient of the
skewness variable is negative and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations (i)-(iv), in-
dicating that uneven lending shares lower the probability of pool formation as
claimed in Hypothesis 2. Next, we ﬁnd that the severity of the distress shock
(rating6) has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on pool formation, in line with
Hypothesis 3. Thus, a shock to the borrower’s credit quality that lowers the rat-
ing to the poorest rating notch is a strong predictor of lender coordination. The
remaining other control variables are insigniﬁcant except for the manufacturing
sector which has a weakly positive impact on pool formation (p<10%).
{insert Table 7 here}
In speciﬁcation (iv) of Table 7, we test whether the relationship between
pool formation and the number of banks is monotonic by substituting diﬀerent
size classes for the number of banks; the middle tertile group (5 − 7 bank rela-
tionships) serves as a reference group. A small number of banks renders pool
formation less likely, while the group of many banks (> 8) is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the reference group. The results are suggestive of a monotonic
relationship between the number of banks and pool formation.
4.2 Determinants of workout success
When analyzing the determinants of workout success, we employ three diﬀerent
estimation procedures. First, we estimate the probability of workout success
using a standard probit assuming the pool variable to be independent of the
error term. We then relax this assumption and estimate the probability of
workout success in a two-stage estimation with an instrumented pool variable
thereby controlling for endogeneity. Furthermore, we estimate a duration model,
where the length of time needed to recover from the distress shock is used as
the success indicator.
According to the hyptheses in Section 2, we test whether the probability of
workout success is positively related to the existence of a bank pool, negatively
mind that the housebank variable does not describe the full dimension of the housebank
status from the client’s perspective, since it does not allow for any other bank taking the role
of a housebank.
13Signiﬁcant at the 5%-a n d10%-level in speciﬁcations (i) and (ii) respectively, with the
same sign, and insigniﬁcant in speciﬁcation (iii).
19related to the number of bank lenders, negatively related to the size of the bank
pool, and negatively related to the severity of the distress shock. In the duration
model, coeﬃcients are expected to have opposite signs compared to the probit
analysis since a longer distress episode indicates a less successful workout.
The dependent variable captures the recovery from distress. One way to
operationalize workout success relies on bank-internal corporate ratings. As
explained earlier, these ratings are expected to represent an unbiased estimate
of borrower default probability. The estimates are based on the information
acquired by the bank throughout its relationship with the borrower. Although
it might be preferable to use other performance data as well in determination
of success, e.g. the company’s balance sheet data, these are hardly available
during distress, or are published with a substantial time lag. This is evident
from our data, where the number of balance sheet items that are missing or
are stale, rises dramatically after the initial distress event. Since banks do not
stop evaluating the borrower quality once the borrower is in distress, although
accounting data are poor, we are conﬁdent that internal ratings provide the best
information available for indicating business success or business failure.
4.2.1 Ordinary probit
First, we estimate the probability of workout success as an ordinary probit on the
full sample of 95 companies employing two diﬀerent speciﬁcations as described
in equations (2) and (3).W ed e ﬁne a workout to be successful whenever, by the
end of our observation window, the internal rating migrates upwards, thereby
overcoming distress by means of its rating classiﬁcation. On our calibrated
1 to 6 rating scale (best to worst), notches 5 and 6 are reserved for distress,
or highly speculative and default cases, while notches 1 − 4 are categorized as
investment to speculative grades (see Table 2 for details). A workout is also
termed successful when rebanking occurs, i.e. debt is fully discharged after a
change in ownership of the company, which happens in 3 cases (see Panel B of
Table 6)14. The dependent variable will be labeled success,a n di ss e te q u a lt o
one if rating 4 or better has been achieved subsequent to a distress rating of 5
or 6, or if the client has rebanked; the dependent variable is otherwise zero. A
dummy value of zero does not imply that the workout has failed, and corporate
assets are liquidated. It may simply reﬂect the fact that the case has not yet
been resolved at the end of our observation window. Independent variables in
Equations (2) and (3) include the existence of a bank pool, the number of bank
relationships, the severity of the distress shock, and several control variables.
successi = fi
µ
pool,#banks,rating6,ifo,assets,
hb,collateral,industry,time2end
¶
(2)
14In this sample we observe rebanking only following a change in ownership and with no
discount. We are not aware of any case in which banks, ceteris paribus, sell oﬀ their loans to
new lenders. Therefore we treat rebanking as representing success for the respective banks.
20successii = fii
µ
poolsma,poolbig,#banks,rating6,ifo,
assets,hb,collateral,industry,time2end
¶
(3)
We cannot account for the size of the pool per se. However, from conver-
sations with bankers we know that under normal circumstances a bank pool
comprises all relevant lending institutions. In order to estimate the eﬀect of
pool size on workout success, Equation (2) comprises a pool dummy, the log
of number of banks (#banks), and an interaction term of both. In (3) we
diﬀerentiate between small pools (poolsma) and large pools (poolbig). The
dummy variable poolsma equals one whenever there is a pool and the number
of active bank relationships is at most 4, the lower tertile of the distribution.
Analogously, poolbig equals one if a pool exists and the number of banks po-
tentially involved is 5 or higher. The reference group consists of all relationships
without a pool. Thus, the number of existing bank relationships during the dis-
tress event is used as a proxy for the size of the pool in Equations (2) and
(3). Additional explanatory variables include the severity of the distress shock
(rating6), the ifo index, the size of the company (assets), the hb-dummy,
collateralization, two industry dummies (machin, manuf), and the time
between the distress event and the end of the observation period (time2end).
Estimation results are documented in speciﬁcations (i-iv) of Table 8.
{insert Table 8 here}
Starting with columns (i) and ( ii), which are two speciﬁcations of Equation
(2) we ﬁnd the existence of a pool to have a positive and signiﬁcant impact
on workout success (p<1%), supporting Hypothesis 4. Furthermore, a large
number of bank relationships reduces the positive eﬀect of the pool variable on
workout success. The interaction term (pool ×log(#banks)) has a negative
coeﬃcient, which is signiﬁcant (p<1%), supporting Hypothesis 6. Note that
the unconditional eﬀect of the number of banks on the probability of workout
success turns out to be insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, rejecting Hypothesis 5.
Other than in Equation (2), the distinction between small and large pools,
as addressed in Hypothesis 6, is explicitly realized in Equation (3) where the
workout eﬀect of the pool is conditional on its size. The results are reported in
columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 8. For small pools, the impact on workout success
is found to be positive (p<5%), while it is negative for large pools, comprising 5
or more banks (p<1%).T h eﬁnding that large pools actually lower the success
probability of workouts is striking; thus Hypothesis 4 cannot be conﬁrmed when
a distinction is made between small and large pools. It raises the question why,
given that there are many bank relationships, bank pools are formed in the ﬁrst
place? It may partially be explained by the fact that our measure of severity
does not diﬀerentiate very well between ambulant and in-patient cases, i.e. the
non-pool subsample comprises a higher fraction of ambulant cases, supported
by our descriptive statistics (see Table 6). However, a comprehensive answer
to this question has to look beyond the role of pools as a workout coordination
device. We take up this question in the concluding section. Apart from these key
21observations, the coeﬃcient of rating6, measuring distress severity, and those
of other control variables in speciﬁcations (i) to (iv) of Table 8 are insigniﬁcant.
Thus, Hypothesis 7 cannot be supported.
4.2.2 Two-stage estimation
A two-stage estimation is carried out as a robustness check, controlling for the
possible endogeneity of pool formation with respect to workout success. For this
purpose we instrument the pool variable in Equations (2) and (3), following
Maddala (1983). As an instrument for the pool, we take the probability of
pool formation from the base case regression (i) in Table 7, which therefore
constitutes the ﬁrst stage regression. The instruments replacing poolsma and
poolbig are also calculated from the base case regression (i) in Table 7. In
stage two we then re-estimate speciﬁcations (i) and (iii) of Table 8. The results
of the second stage are reported in columns (v) and (vi) of Table 8. It shows
that controlling for endogeneity of the pool variable has an eﬀect on the level
of signiﬁcance in some cases, but it leaves the qualitative results unchanged
throughout. In (v), the existence of a pool increases workout performance,
while the signiﬁcance levels of both the pool variable and the interaction term
are lower than before. In (vi), small and large pools have again opposing eﬀects
on pool performance. Here, the signiﬁcance level of the large pool coeﬃcient
decreases from 1% to 10%.
4.2.3 Duration analysis
In determining the probability of workout success, we have so far used time2end-
dummy variables as controls for the length of the observation window after the
distress event. To look more closely into the time dependence of workout suc-
cess, we employ a duration model with monthly data. Workout success is now
measured as length of the distress episode, i.e. the time in months between the
distress event and the rating upgrade or rebanking. Both measures of workout
success are related, since we have a restricted observation window. The set of
explanatory variables coincides with those of the preceding base-case probit re-
gressions (i) and (iii) of Table 8. The coeﬃcients are expected to have opposite
signs compared to the probits, since the dependent variable, i.e. the length of
the workout period, is an inverse measure of workout success. Workout perfor-
mance is higher, when recovery is reached after a shorter time period. Thus,
the duration model uses the full set of information that we have on the time
dimension of workout success. For the speciﬁcation of the duration model we
use a log-linear survival function, assuming an underlying Weibull distribution.
Speciﬁcations (vii) and (viii) of Table 8 report the two speciﬁcations of the
duration model corresponding to the base-case probit regressions (i) and (iii).
The results and signiﬁcance levels are in line with those of the probit estima-
tion, where workout success instead of workout duration served as the dependent
variable. Thus, the existence of a pool reduces the time needed to achieve suc-
cess, while an increasing number of banks, conditional on a pool being formed,
22lengthens the time required to terminate a workout successfully (speciﬁcation
(vii) of Table 8). The two key variables, pool and the interaction term, turn out
to be signiﬁcant at the 5% level in (vii). Furthermore, the severity of the dis-
tress shock lengthens the time of the distress episode, and it delays an eventual
success, with a 5% level of signiﬁcance, supporting Hypothesis 7. If we diﬀeren-
tiate between small and large pools, as in speciﬁcation (viii) of Table 8, we ﬁnd
that small pools decrease (p<10%) and large pools increase (p<5%) workout
duration, respectively. In terms of explicit workout duration, the model predicts
that 95% of all cases spend at least 10 months in distress and the median spell
is about 50 months. These estimates are broadly in line with what bankers have
told us in conversations, namely that workout episodes in Germany tend to be
quite extended, typically lasting for several years.
Overall, the duration analysis supports our earlier ﬁndings. The distinction
between small and large pools reveals that large pools need more time to achieve
rating recovery. This result is in line with Hypothesis 6, while it refutes Hy-
pothesis 4: large pools’ distress duration is not only longer than that of small
pools, it is also longer than the time companies without a pool need to recover
from distress. This again raises the question as to the reasons for the formation
of pools when there are many rather than few banks.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we analyze empirically how banks cope with distressed corporate
borrowers in a multiple banking environment. In particular, the paper sheds
light on how coordination among lenders is achieved, and what implications
successful coordination has for the survival of the borrower. We have access
to a unique data set that contains detailed credit-ﬁle information on distressed
medium-sized companies sampled from six German banks.
While the distress of corporate borrowers has always been an important topic
in ﬁnancial economics, the more speciﬁc question of how the debt structure, in
particular multiple lending, aﬀects the performance of distressed companies has
not yet received much attention. The major contribution of our study concerns
the identiﬁcation of bank pools as viable and relevant contractual arrangements.
The occurrence of bank pools as a common instrument in German corporate
lending demonstrates that lender coordination can be reached outside court
supervision. We show that bank pools aﬀect the probability of workout success.
The sign of this impact depends on pool size. Small pools signiﬁcantly increase
the probability of workout success, while large pools reduce the likelihood of
success. This ﬁnding supports the view that the beneﬁt of pool formation, and
thus the prevention of a run on company assets, has to be traded oﬀ against the
bargaining costs among pool members. These costs tend to increase with pool
size. The shape of the workout success function squares well with reports from
practitioners who claim that large pools are a nightmare, while small pools tend
to operate more smoothly. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for
a workout to be successful ﬁnds that large pools increase the required workout
23spell signiﬁcantly.
The formation of a bank pool is an important decision, requiring an initial
attempt to coordinate the interests of several lenders. In particular, lenders
have to be convinced that they will beneﬁt individually from continuing the
relationship with the borrower right away. We have modeled the decision to
form a bank pool and ﬁnd that it is more likely to emerge when the number of
banks is large, individual banks’ lending shares are heterogenous, and borrower
quality is hit by a substantial shock, according to the initial distress rating.
T h ee c o n o m i cr a t i o n a l ef o rt h ee m e r g e n c eo fp o o l si sm o r ed i ﬃcult to explain
for large pools, and it cannot be attributed to workout success in these cases.
One possible explanation is based on the redistributive motives of bank lenders
vis-à-vis other lenders of the company, e.g. trade creditors, and the pool for-
mation in view of bargaining costs in liquidation along the lines of Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996). It will be through the use of historical recovery rates that
one may evaluate the merit of this interpretation. Another possibility is that
the distinction between out-patient and in-patient distressed borrowers may not
be perfectly captured by the severity variable, and the pool, comprising fewer
out-patient cases, therefore covers part of the eﬀect.
Getting beyond the current level of understanding bank pool formation may
require a cross-country perspective, where elements of the legal infrastructure,
especially the bankruptcy code, can be used as additional explanatory variables.
Reviewing the multiple banking environment in France and Italy and their dif-
ferent legal backgrounds, i.e. the French Napoleonic Code and the Latin tradi-
tion, creditor coordination prior to formal bankruptcy proceedings exists in the
more creditor-friendly Italy, while it is absent in rather debtor-friendly France.
Combining the view on bank coordination in these countries with the detailed
evidence on bank pools in Germany, presented in this paper, we conclude that
the fundamental orientation of the bankruptcy code has important ex-ante ef-
fects on the way companies and banks interact. A strong creditor-orientation, in
particular the stringency with which privately agreed collateral rights are hon-
ored in any subsequent formal court proceeding, is conducive to the formation
of pool agreements.
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AS t a n d a r d p o o l c o n t r a c t -
Abbreviated English version
The Creditor Pool contract is to be agreed upon as a non-trading partnership
between the Pool leader (Bank A),
Bank B,
Bank C,
...
and the company (borrower), as well as third party debtors.
§1 Credit Facilities
· Listing of credit lines granted by the contact for each bank and type of credit
concerned.
· The banks agree to uphold the credit lines for the duration of the contract.
Reductions or deletions shall only occur by mutual consent. This does not hold
for credit commitments granted outside the pool.
§2 Collateral
· Listing of
1a) collateral furnished by the company to the banks and collateral to be fur-
nished per bank.
1b) collateral to be furnished by the company in favor of the pool leader and
each individual bank simultaneously and with equal ranking.
2a) collateral furnished by third party debtors to the banks and collateral to be
furnished per bank.
2b) collateral to be furnished by third party debtors in favor of the pool leader
and of each bank simultaneously and with equal ranking.
· In the event that a speciﬁc bank in the future is to be is furnished with collat-
eral with regard to one of the credit lines cited in §1, then this shall considered
to be part of the pool contract.
· In the event that a bank extends additional credit, then the collateral fur-
nished in this context shall also be included in the pool contract but shall serve
primarily to repay these additional credit facilities.
· The company can furnish collateral to third parties only after having instructed
the banks of its intention.
§3 Collateral Purpose
· Company collateral as well as that of third party debtors serves to secure
existing and future bank claims arising from the granting of credits cited in §1.
28§4 Retransfer/Collateral Release
· When all claims have been satisﬁed in accordance with §3, then the banks are
required to retransfer to the company and third party debtors collateral against
which no claims have been made.
· Pool collateral must be partially or wholly released if its realizable value more
than temporarily exceeds __% of the secured claims.
§5 Trust Relationship/Collateral Administration
· The Pool leader administers in a ﬁduciary capacity for the other banks the
collateral collected within this contract.
· The release of collateral requires the consent of all the banks.
§6 Realization
· The Pool leader realizes in its own name the collateral cited in §2 for the banks’
account.
· When and whether collateral is to be realized is decided by the banks in mutual
consent.
§7 Balance Settlement
· As far as possible the company is to draw upon the credit lines cited in §1
equally.
· The banks are committed in the event of realization and as requested at any
time by a speciﬁc bank to bring into line via transfer entries that part of their
credit utilization which does not exceed the credit lines cited in §1, such that it
corresponds to that of the credit lines.
§8 Revenue Distribution
· Revenue deriving from the realization of collateral is to be utilized according
to the following order of priorities:
a) costs, taxes and other expenses incurred during the administration and real-
ization of collateral, Pool leader remuneration,
b) repayment of the banks’ credit demands in accordance with §1 in equal pro-
portion to the utilization after the balance settlement,
c) repayment of those claims exceeding the credit lines in equal ranking with
the excesses,
d) repayment of the bank’s additional credits in equal ranking to the utilization
as long as this has not been ascribed to the utilization of separately furnished
collateral,
e) the satisfying of other bank claims in equal ranking with the ratio of these
claims.
· The banks are entitled to alter the distribution key.
· Any revenue ensuing, which is not needed, is to be paid over to the company
or the third party creditors respectively.
§9 Costs, Taxes, Remuneration
· All costs and taxes deriving from this Pool contract, particularly those from
29the administration or any realization, are to be borne by the company.
· In the event that these costs and taxes are not paid by the company, then they
shall be borne by the banks in keeping with the credit lines cited in §1.
§10 Brieﬁng
· The banks are to inform each other reciprocally when circumstances become
known, which may persistently endanger a repayment of the credit lines cited
in §1.
· The banks are required to provide one another on request with information
about both debts outstanding to the company and collateral. The banks are
exempted from banking secrecy.
§11 Deadlines and Notice of Termination
· The Pool contract is to be drawn up for an unspeciﬁed duration.
· Each bank is entitled to terminate the contract with three months notice at the
end of a calendar quarter. The Pool contract will continue with the remaining
banks.
· In the event of notice being served, the banks are reserved the right of distri-
bution with respect to collateral relating to special agreements.
· At the request of any bank a settlement of balance must be undertaken when
the bank which has served notice quits.
· The company and third party creditors may only quit this contract after all
obligations from §1 have been met.
§12 Place of Fulﬁllment and Jurisdiction, and Applicable Law
§13 Contract Amendments and Supplements
§14 Escape Clause
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31Table 1.  Sampling
Panel A. Bank identity
N Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
TOTAL 95 10 21 8 15 22 19
POOL 44 5 11 7 7 4 10
N O  P O O L 5 151 01 81 89
Panel B. Year of distress event and rating at distress event
N 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
TOTAL
 R a t i n g  57 91 22 01 61 51 1 5
 R a t i n g  6 1 6 352330
POOL
 R a t i n g  5 3 2 586643
 R a t i n g  6 1 2 322320
NO POOL
 R a t i n g  5 4 771 2 1 09 7 2
 R a t i n g  6 4030010
Panel C. Industry sectors
N Manufact. Machinery Energy Constr. Trade Services Transport. Others
TOTAL 95 23 25 3 6 12 4 3 19
P O O L 4 4 1 4 1 2 026127
N O  P O O L 5 1 9 1 3 34631 1 2
The table reports basic frequency statistics on the structure of the data set. Panel A describes the frequencies of cases originated from each bank in the sample. Panel B reports the year of the
distress event together with the respective ratings at that time. Panel C divides the sample by industry sectors.Table 2.  Rating standardization
Standardized 
bank rating
B a n k  1B a n k  2B a n k  3B a n k  4B a n k  5B a n k  6 S & P M o o d y
1
outstanding 
quality
1
very good risk
1
outstanding 
quality
1.0 - 1.2 
outstanding 
quality, low risk
1
outstanding 
performance, 
lowest risk
1.00 - 1.49
outstanding 
quality
A+, A
minimum risk,
AAA
AA+ 
AA
AA-
Aaa
Aa1 
Aa2 
Aa3
Highest to High 
Investment 
Grade
2
good quality, 
above average
2
good risk
2
good quality
1.3 - 2.7 
good quality, 
above average
2
high quality, 
above average
1.50 - 2.49
good quality
A-, B+
low risk
A1
A2 
A3 
Baa1 
Baa2
A+
A
A- 
BBB+
BBB
BBB-
Upper Medium 
to Medium 
Investment 
Grade
3
average quality, 
increased risk
3 - 3/4
satisfactory/ 
adequate  risk
3
satisfactory 
quality with 
weaknesses
2.8 - 3.7
average 
quality/risk
3
average 
performance
2.50 - 2.99
satisfactory 
quality
B, B-
satisfactory risk
Ba1
Ba2
Ba3
BB+
BB
BB-
Speculative 
Grade
4
speculative 
grade, 
below average 
quality
4
sufficient risk
4
sufficient 
quality, 
intensive care
3.8 - 4.2
speculative 
grade, intensive 
care
4 - 5
sufficient 
quality, 
increased risk
3.00 - 3.49
sufficient quality
C+, C
high risk, 
problematic
B1
B2
B3
B+
B
B-
5
problematic, 
intensive care, 
reorg.
4/5 - 5
just sufficient / 
insufficient risk
5
deficient quality, 
substantial 
problems
4.3 - 5.7
default 
imminent, 
intensive 
care/reorg.
6 - 7
intensive care, 
weak/neg. 
prospects
3.50 - 4.49
low quality
C-
very high risk, 
insufficient 
quality
Caa1
Caa2
Caa3
Ca
C
CCC+
CCC
CCC-
CC
C
Highly 
Speculative 
Grade
6
default, 
reorg./
liquidation
6
extremely bad 
risk
6 - 7
inadequate 
quality, default
5.8 - 6.5
default, reorg./
liquidation
8
default, 
operating loss, 
neg. prospects
4.50 - 5.00
default or 
imminent 
default
D
extremely high 
risk / default, 
neg. prospect
DD D e f a u l t
Agencies' Rating Categories Bank-Internal Rating CategoriesTable 3.  Company size and debt structure
Panel A:  General company characteristics
Annual 
turnover
Total 
assets 
Debt-to-assets 
ratio
Bank debt-to-
total debt ratio
Number 
of banks
in Million € in Million € in % in %
TOTAL
 Mean 61,6 55,8 70,1 74,3 5,7
 Median 49,4 32,1 70,1 78,6 5,0
 Std Dev. 53,7 77,0 23,6 25,6 3,4
 N 95 95 95 95 95
POOL
 Mean 76,6 61,7 68,6 76,0 6,2
 Median 62,1 43,7 69,7 83,6 6,0
 Std Dev. 61,2 58,0 17,6 25,7 3,2
 N 4 44 44 44 14 4
NO POOL
 Mean 48,7 50,8 71,4 72,7 5,3
 Median 35,6 26,6 70,7 74,7 4,0
 Std. Dev. 42,9 90,4 27,9 25,7 3,5
 N 5 15 15 14 45 1
Mean equality test 6.717** 0,472 0,310 0,352 1,892
Median equality test 8.603*** 6.177** 0,080 0,356 3.595*
Panel B.  Bivariate correlation
Ann. turnover Total assets  Debt per bank
TOTAL
 No. of banks 0.142 0.185* -0.066
 Debt per bank 0.665*** 0.429*** .
POOL
 No. of banks 0.034 0.140 -0.087
 Debt per bank 0.823***  0.849*** .
NO POOL
 No. of banks 0.195 0.199 -0.137
 Debt per bank 0.265* 0.120 .
Panel A of the table reports some summary statistics with respect to the size and the debt structure of the company, taken from the latest balance
sheet available to the bank at the onset of distress. Equality test statistics are Anova F-statistic (mean) and Kruskal-Wallis (median). Panel B
contains Pearson correlation coefficients, where 'Debt per bank' is total bank debt divided by the number of banks. Levels of significance are
indicated as follows: 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***). Figure 1.  Frequency distribution of the number of bank relationships (N=95)
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Panel A.  Workout measures at the distress event (t=0) and one year after (t=1)
Credit line 
reduction
Postponed 
payments 
Consultancy 
services
Loss 
provisioning
N in % of N in % of N in % of N in % of N
TOTAL
 t = 0 95 33.7 8.4 21.1 21.1
 t = 1 95 20.0 10.5 20.0 29.5
POOL
 t = 0 44 36.4 15.9 31.8 34.1
 t = 1 44 25.0 15.9 27.3 40.9
NO POOL
 t = 0 51 31.4 2.0 11.8 9.8
 t = 1 51 15.7 5.9 13.7 19.6
Panel B.  Workout outcome
Rating 
improvement
Completed 
rebanking
Formal 
bankruptcy
Informal 
winding up
Ongoing 
distress
N in % of N in % of N in % of N in % of N in % of N
TOTAL 95 32.6 3.2 11.6 3.2 49.5
POOL 44 25.0 2.3 11.4 4.6 56.8
NO POOL 51 39.2 3.9 11.8 2.0 43.1
The table summarizes the relative importance of workout measures, taken by the bank at the time of the distress event (t=0) and one year
later (t=1), and workout outcomes as observed by the end of the observation window. Panel A and Panel B report relative frequency
statistics with respect to the total sample (N=95), the pool subsample (N=44), and the non-pool subsample (N=51).Table 7.  Determinants of pool formation
The table reports regression coefficients of pool formation. The probability of pool formation is estimated as a binary probit, the dependent 
variable POOL is a dummy equal to 1 if a pool is formed during our observation period, and 0 otherwise. B1, B2, ..., B6 are (1,0)-dummies for 
the identity of the observed bank. #BANKS is the number of bank relationships of the company at the distress event. BANKSSMA is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the number of bank relationships at the distress event is at most 4, and 0 otherwise. BANKSBIG is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
number of bank relationships at the distress event is larger than 4, and 0 otherwise. SKEWNESS=|(BANKDEBT/TOTALBANKDEBT)-
(1/#BANKS)| measures the heterogeneity of bank lending. RATING6 is a dummy equal to 1 if the rating at the distress event is 6, and 0 
otherwise. IFO is the IFO business climate index. ASSET is the value of company's total assets taken from the latest balance sheet available at 
the distress event measured in Million €. HB is a dummy equal to 1 if the observed bank is housebank, and 0 otherwise. COLLATERAL is the 
collateralized portion of loan exposure measured in per cent. MACHIN (MANUF) are dummies equal to 1 if the company belongs to the industry 
sector machinery (manufacturing), and 0 otherwise. TIME2END1-2 (TIME2END3) are dummies equal to 1 if the observation window ends 1-2 
years (3 years) after the distress event, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses, and levels of significance are indicated as follows: 
10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***).
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
B1 -6.504**
(3.096)
-6.057*
(3.194)
-7.700**
(3.274)
-4.696
(3.151)
B2 -5.702*
(3.008)
-5.174*
(3.136)
-6.894**
(3.182)
-3.853
(3.126)
B3 -4.904
(3.000)
-4.417
(3.113)
-6.286*
(3.210)
-2.959
(3.128)
B4 -6.104**
(3.023)
-5.617*
(3.127)
-7.530**
(3.247)
-4.205
(3.133)
B5 -7.494**
(3.058)
-7.055**
(3.149)
-8.755***
(3.247)
-5.628*
(3.161)
B6 -6.127**
(3.058)
-5.590*
(3.188)
-7.356**
(3.248)
-4.507
(3.154)
log(#BANKS) .649**
(.322)
.585*
(.341)
.538
(.330)
-
BANKSSMA - - - -.878**
(.383)
BANKSXXL - - - -.479
(.442)
SKEWNESS -2.173**
(1.037)
-2.137**
(1.049)
-2.148**
(1.067)
-2.027*
(1.048)
RATING6 1.133**
(.481)
1.194**
(.512)
1.271**
(.510)
.995**
(.467)
IFO .047
(.034)
.045
(.035)
.060*
(.036)
.043
(.034)
log(ASSET) .289
(.179)
.291
(.179)
.284
(.182)
.298
(.179)*
HB - -.212
(.385)
--
COLLATERAL - -.205
(.527)
--
MACHIN - - .597
(.454)
-
MANUF - - .687*
(.407)
-
TIME2END1-2 .179
(.416)
.162
(.422)
.277
(.430)
.215
(.421)
TIME2END3 -.040
(.495)
-.013
(.500)
-.176
(.517)
-.112
(.488)
McFadden .310 .314 .335 .319
N 9 59 59 59 5Table 8.  Determinants of workout success
The table reports regressions on the determinants of workout success. Regressions (i)-(iv) estimate the probability of workout success as an ordinary 
probit, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the company is upgraded to rating 4 or rebanked during our observation period, and 0 otherwise. 
POOL is a dummy equal to 1 if pool formation is observed, and 0 otherwise. #BANKS is the number of bank relationships of the company at the 
distress event. POOLSMA is a dummy equal to 1 if pool formation is observed and the number of bank relationships at the distress event is 4 or lower, 
and 0 otherwise. POOLBIG is a dummy equal to 1 if pool formation is observed and the number of bank relationships at the distress event is higher 
than 4, and 0 otherwise. RATING6 is a dummy equal to 1 if the rating at the distress event is 6, and 0 otherwise. IFO is the IFO business climate index. 
ASSET is the value of company's total assets taken from the latest balance sheet available at the distress event measured in Million €. HB is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the observed bank is housebank, and 0 otherwise. COLLATERAL is the collateralized portion of loan exposure measured in per cent. 
MACHIN (MANUF) are dummies equal to 1 if the company belongs to the industry sector machinery (manufacturing), and 0 otherwise. 
TIME2END1-2 (TIME2END3) are dummies equal to 1 if the observation window ends 1-2 years (3 years) after the distress event, and 0 otherwise. 
Regressions (v)-(vi) represent the second stage of a two-stage analysis using the estimates of pool formation regression (7.i) as an instrument for POOL 
and, accordingly, for POOLSMA and POOLBIG. Regressions (vii)-(viii) represent a duration model using Weibull distribution where the dependent 
variable is the length of time between the distress event and a rating upgrade to 4 or better or until rebanking, measured in months. Standard errors are 
in parentheses, levels of significance are indicated as follows: 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***).
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1) (viii)
2)
CONSTANT 1.185
(2.856)
.186
(3.109)
.799
(2.890)
.666
(3.137)
1.902
(2.668)
1.348
(2.711)
4.967***
(1.906)
4.873**
(1.943)
POOL 4.819***
(1.362)
4.685***
(1.401)
- - 1.714*
(.961)
- -2.671**
(1.159)
-
POOLSMA - - 1.206**
(.469)
1.138**
(.497)
- 1.001**
(.465)
- -.484*
(.286)
POOLBIG - - -1.411***
(.434)
-1.425***
(.448)
- -.649*
(.371)
- .988**
(.478)
log(#BANKS) .401
(.279)
.541
(.348)
.309
(.264)
.399
(.324)
.119
(.281)
.154
(.259)
-.215
(.238)
-.153
(.221)
(POOL)x(#BANKS) -3.255***
(.859)
-3.215***
(.885)
- - -1.049*
(.545)
- 1.843**
(.772)
-
RATING6 -.796
(.552)
-.776
(.623)
-.546
(.518)
-.543
(.574)
-.719
(.459)
-.719
(.475)
1.002**
(.489)
.554
(.408)
IFO -.022
(.033)
-.010
(.035)
-.016
(.033)
-.012
(.035)
-.027
(.031)
-.021
(.031)
-.010
(.021)
-.009
(.021)
log(ASSET) - -.178
(.174)
- -.152
(.168)
----
HB - .142
(.345)
- -.005
(.346)
----
COLLATERAL - .252
(.541)
- .237
(.522)
----
MACHIN - .171
(.419)
- .052
(.414)
----
MANUF - .561
(.408)
- .326
(.412)
----
TIME2END1-2 -.107
(.391)
-.176
(.401)
-.326
(.400)
-.364
(.405)
-.096
(.364)
-.062
(.374)
--
TIME2END3 .514
(.450)
.394
(.465)
.381
(.453)
.345
(.467)
.554
(.433)
.518
(.436)
--
Sigma - - - - - - .599***
(.113)
.600***
(.122)
McFadden .230 .258 .252 .267 .082 .134 - -
N 9 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 5
1)  Percentiles of the survival distribution are 77 (.25), 51 (.50), 30 (.75), and 10 (.95) months
2)  Percentiles of the survival distribution are 74 (.25), 49 (.50), 29 (.75), and 10 (.95) months